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Abstract—With the increasing popularity of the Internet of
Things(IoT) devices, the demand for fast and convenient battery
charging services grows rapidly. Wireless charging is a promising
technology for such a purpose and its usage has become ubiqui-
tous. However, the close distance between the charger and the de-
vice being charged not only makes proximity-based and near field
communication attacks possible, but also introduces a new type
of vulnerabilities. In this paper, we propose to create fingerprints
for wireless chargers based on the intrinsic non-linear distortion
effects of the underlying charging circuit. Using such fingerprints,
we design the WirelessID system to detect potential short-range
malicious wireless charging attacks. WirelessID collects signals
in the standby state of the charging process and sends them
to a trusted server, which can extract the fingerprint and then
identify the charger. We conduct experiments on 8 commercial
chargers over a period of 5 months and collect 8000 traces of
signal. We use 10% of the traces as the training dataset and the
rest for testing. Results show that on the standard performance
metrics, we have achieved 99.0% precision, 98.9% recall and
98.9% F1-score.
Index Terms—Wireless charging, hardware fingerprint, short-
range security, machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the most important technological changes in
recent years, the Internet of Things (IoT) has stimulated market
demand for smart home, intelligent vehicle, wearable device,
smart city and other scenarios. A wide range of IoT devices
supplying through wireless power is an attractive solution
[1] [2]. As an energy source to power IoT devices, wireless
charging technology has been a popular functionality, and
wireless charging devices are also an important component of
IoT system [3]. Infrastructure based on wireless charging will
have a huge market share in the hardware of IoT. The global
wireless charging market reached a value of US$ 6.9 Billion in
2018, growing at a CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate)
of 24.6% during 2011-2018 [4]. Annual shipment volume is
expected to top one billion units by 2020 and two billions
by 2025 [5]. In order to facilitate charging, wireless charging
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facilities are widely deployed in different public IoT scenario,
including airports, coffee shops, hotels, libraries, and other
places. Although these charging facilities bring convenience to
users, they also bring some security threats. Because wireless
charging facilities in public areas are not controlled by users,
it is likely that some devices for malicious attacks are installed
at the same time.
Wireless charging technology requires a centimeter-level of
proximity between the charger and the device to be charged.
Like other short-range services, this opens doors to short-rage
attacks such as proximity-based attacks and near field commu-
nication (NFC) attack. For example, in the recently reported
Tap’n Ghost attack [6], attackers can re-direct victim’s click on
the smartphone to other options (such as connecting the phone
to a malicious WiFi) by sending short-range signals to distort
the electric field of the capacitive touch screen. As another
example, by being close to the victim’s smartphone, attackers
can obtain NFC UID without being noticed by the victim. The
stolen NFC UID may cause many privacy problems.
Wireless charging scenario can be easily utilized by short-
range attackers as it requires very close contact between
the smartphone and the charger. Attackers may disguise the
attacking device as a public charger or hide it underneath the
charger to launch short-range attacks while the victim charges
his smartphone. Moreover, wireless charging introduces new
attacks such as battery security problems. By tampering with
the charger, attackers can impact the lifetime of the battery and
even exploit the surge to affect the circuit of the device. The
left side of Fig. 1 illustrates one of such attack scenarios. Alice
puts her smartphone on a wireless charger, then the malicious
charger can perform attacks to cause various hazards. With the
continuous development of IoT technology, this kind of secu-
rity threat will continue to increase, because attackers can use
IoT network to tamper and control wireless charger remotely
In addition, the existing work has carried on extensive research
on the mobile phone wired charging attack. These works attack
the side channel of the smartphone when it is charged by wire,
which may also threaten the wireless charging security in the
future. Some allow the attacker to identify the webpage loaded
when the smartphone is charged [7], some are used by the
attacker to infer the location of the mobile device [8], and
even the attacker may steal the password of the lock screen
and other privacy information [9].
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Fig. 1. Left: An attack model in IoT scenario where the malicious charger
hidden underneath a table can launch proximity-based attack such as the Tapn
Ghost attack [6]. Right: The proposed WirelessID system. The phone will
collect signals and send them to the cloud to identify the charger. A warning
will be issued when an untrusted charger is identified.
Identifying and authenticating the wireless charger is a
natural solution to defend against the above attacks. In the
most commonly used cryptography-based device authentica-
tion method, mutual challenge-response is usually adopted,
which requires information exchange between the smartphone
and the wireless charger. However, the smartphone’s wireless
charging module can only transmit battery information such
as the amount of battery left. So the cryptography-based
method cannot be used. In addition, authentication based on
cryptography is computation-intensive and may not be the
best solution for battery-starving devices. Finally, it is also
vulnerable to various attacks such as violent cracking, side-
channel or man-in-the-middle attacks. Therefore, it is critical
to design a practical and effective authentication method for
wireless chargers.
In this paper, we propose to detect untrusted charger by
exploiting wireless signal’s fingerprints, which are unique and
hard to be tampered with. Based on such intrinsic fingerprints,
we design WirelessID, a system consisting of a trusted cloud
server, a wireless charger and a wireless charging receiver
coil in a smartphone, as shown on the right side of Fig. 1.
WirelessID system works as follows: before the wireless
charging pad requests a connection, the system collects signals
from the receiving coil and sends them to the trusted cloud
server. The server will extract features (“fingerprint) from the
signal and match it with a database of trusted chargers. If a
match is found, the charger is authenticated. Otherwise, the
charger will be considered as untrusted and the system will
warn the user about charging on the untrusted wireless charger.
The followings are our contributions in this paper:
• We propose a fingerprinting method for the wireless
charger through the wireless charging signal in the charg-
ing circuit of the device being charged. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first fingerprinting approach
for wireless charging scenarios.
• Based on the above fingerprint, we design the WirelessID
authentication system which performs signal collection,
feature extraction, and fingerprint matching to reliably
and accurately identify wireless chargers.
• We validate WirelessID on 8 commercial wireless charg-
ers. The results show that the proposed authentication
system can achieve 99.0% precision, 98.9% recall and
98.9% F1-score.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the basic principle of wireless charging and the related
work on short-range security and hardware fingerprinting. The
threat model and the wireless charging problem are demon-
strated in Section III. Our solution and WirelessID system are
detailed in Section IV, followed by the system evaluation in
Section V. Section VI discusses the security of our system and
the limitations. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper and
looking forward to future work.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the principle and application
of wireless charging followed by related work on short-range
security and hardware fingerprinting.
A. Basic Principles of Wireless Charging Technology
Wireless charging, also known as inductive charging or
cordless charging, uses an electromagnetic field to transfer
energy between two objects via electromagnetic induction.
Induction chargers use an induction coil to create an alter-
nating electromagnetic field from within a charging base, and
a second induction coil in the portable device such as a
smartphone takes power from the electromagnetic field and
converts it back into electric current to charge the battery. The
two induction coils in proximity combine to form an electrical
transformer [10]. The effective distance for commercial wire-
less charger products is generally within the range of 0.5cm
to 3cm. The charging devices can be dock based, namely a
charging pad, or surface based where multiple coils are used
to provide a better user experience in terms of larger charging
area and more flexible angles. The Qi wireless charging
standard by the Wireless Power Consortium (WPC) alliance
is the mainstream wireless charging standard [11]. Among the
components of a wireless charger, the most important part
is its inverter through which a charging board converts DC
power supply into AC power, followed by energy transmission
through the inductance coil which is depicted in Fig. 2.
With the wave of information industry set off by the Internet
of Things, wireless charging plays an important role in it.
Lai [3] proposed an IoT-Based wireless charging service for
public. At the same time, Wireless charging provides a great
solution for IoT devices whose lifetime is significantly limited
by the Battery life [12] [13] [14] [15]. Besides, more and more
wireless mobile chargers are introduced in wireless sensor
networks to supplement the power of nodes to solve the key
problem of limited energy [2] [16] [17].
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Fig. 2. Composition of a typical wireless charger. The inverter module is the
most important part as it converts DC power to AC form and then energy is
transmitted by the inductance coil L wirelessly.
B. Related Work
Security vulnerabilities of short-range wireless service have
been well-documented in IoT scenario. Bond et al. [18] illus-
trate attacks against EMV card with the flaw of EMV protocol.
The security issues of RFID have been analyzed by many
researchers such as [19] [20] [21]. Madlmayr et al. [22] and
Eun et al. [23] study the security and privacy of NFC. White
[24] designs a wireless charging system by using the resonant
parameter as key so the charging board can authenticate
smartphones, where the two parties are required to exchange
keys constantly. The security problem of short-range acoustic
communication in IoT network is studied in [25], Zhang et al.
propose a secure acoustic short-range communication system
between IoT devices.
Intrinsic physical features of the device can be used as
hardware fingerprints to identify different devices by utilizing
the variations in hardware fabrication process. Many types
of silicon physical unclonable functions (PUF) have been
proposed for device authentication, secret key generation and
other applications. Frequency discrepancy [26] [27] and clock
skews [28] [29] are commonly used to identify wireless
devices. Sensors on mobile device such as accelerometers [30],
gyroscopes [31], microphones [32], speakers [33] and cameras
[34] can also be used as fingerprint.
III. THE SECURE WIRLESS CHARGING PROBLEM
Security issues are brought up by the trending wireless
charging technique. We consider the following simple yet
realistic scenario: Alice is at a public place and has her
smartphone running low on battery. Luckily Alice has the
option to charge her smartphone through the wireless charging
services that are now available in more and more public IoT
scenario, such as an attentive service restaurant(Fig. 3(a)),
an airport(Fig. 3(b)), or a coffee shop(Fig. 3(c)). It could also
be a wireless charger provided by a hotel(Fig. 3(d)) or third-
party. However, Alice charges her smartphones with a public
wireless charger that is not controlled by herself. However, is
there any bad consequence for such wireless charging?
(a) A wireless charger in a restaurant. (b) Wireless chargers at an airport.
(c) A wireless charger in a coffee
shop.
(d) Wireless charger in hotels.
Fig. 3. There are many wireless chargers for users in public IoT scenario
such as restaurants, airports, coffee shops and hotels.
Just like using public WiFi could result in the loss of
sensitive information, Alice will be exposed to many security
threats the moment she puts her phone on a wireless charging
board because various attacks can be launched if this charger
is fully controlled by attacker Eve. For example, Eve can
tamper with a trusted charger remotely from IoT network
or build a malicious one and install it at the public place
waiting for victims like Alice to charge their phones. When
Alice starts charging her phone, because of the proximity
of the phone and the malicious charger and the nontrivial
amount of the charging time when this proximity needs to
be maintained, Alices’ phone is subject to most if not all the
proximity-based attacks such as the Tap’n Ghost attack [6]
and the NFC attacks. When there are applications running on
the phone, they might be vulnerable to side-channel attacks,
which can identify the private information such as the webpage
opened by the smartphone, the location, and the password
of the lock screen. Furthermore, Eve can damage the battery
of Alices’ phone by repeatedly charging-discharging-charging.
What Alice needs is a way to convince herself that these
attacks will not happen or very unlikely to happen.
In this paper, we propose WirelessID, a system supported
by a trusted cloud server, to enable a user like Alice to secure
the wireless charging process by identifying the untrusted
chargers in public place. For Alice to use WirelessID, she only
needs her device such as a smartphone to have a charging
receiver coil, which is required for wireless charging, and
the capability to communicate with WirelessID’s server. By
identifying the public wireless chargers and only charging on
trusted chargers, most of the aforementioned threats can be
effectively mitigated.
Before we elaborate the design of WirelessID, we mention
that it is designed to provide secure wireless charging in the
following scenarios: (1) Eve leaves another attacking device
close to a genuine charger (e.g. hiding it underneath the
charger); (2) in the phone to phone wireless charging supported
by companies like HUAWEI and SAMSUNG where one phone
is malicious; or (3) the attacker only tampers with the software
of the wireless charging device to obtain information such
as the battery capacity of the smartphone. For case (1), the
risk and damage do not come from the charger. In (2), a
malicious phone is much more complicated and powerful than
a wireless charger to launch attacks on the other phone. In (3),
the attacker is not easy to tamper with the program of wireless
charging device chip, and the threat of this attack is not great.
These cases are out of the scope of this paper where we focus
on identifying untrusted chargers to ensure the security of the
wireless charging.
IV. IDENTIFYING CHARGER BY FINGERPRINTING
The basic idea of our solution to the secure wireless
charging problem is to establish a fingerprint for each charger
so before the charging starts, the phone can identify the
charger and decide whether the charging will be safe or not.
Our WirelessID system is based on this concept and will be
elaborated in this section.
A. The Non-linear Distortion Effect of Inverters
In order to stimulate alternating magnetic field from DC
power supply, inverters are the essential part for energy trans-
mission. Power inverters employ switch devices such as Metal-
Oxide-Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistor (MOSFET) and
triode and MOSFET is dominant in nowadays wireless charg-
ers to fulfill the transmission frequency requirement between
100 kHz to 200 kHz specified by the Qi standard.
Switching devices including MOSFET have been reported
to have a non-linear distortion effect [35] as MOSFET in
essence is not ideal. We also conducted an experiment to
verify the effect using three stand-alone MOSFET inverters,
i.e., IRF530N-1/2/3. As shown in the Fig. 4, Vdc is the
voltage between the drain and source of the MOSFET, and
its change rate is non-linear during switching, either in the
turn-off (Fig. 4a) or turn-on processes (Fig. 4b). Moreover,
from Fig. 4 we can find that the non-linear distortions are
distinct for different MOSFETs, even they are of the same
model, e.g., the IRF530N series. This is reasonable because
there are differences during the manufacturing processes for
each MOSFET and the difference is a combination of multiple
stochastic processes. This generation of the nonlinear distor-
tion can be formalized in Equation 1.
y(t) = x(t) ∗ e(t) (1)
For simplicity, the output signal of the inverter y(t) can
be seen as the ideally linear signal x(t) multiplied by a non-
linear distortion parameter e(t). When the DC power supply
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Fig. 4. Non-linear distortion effects of MOSFET devices. Distortions exist in
both the turn-off and turn-on switching processes and the distortions exhibit
difference among different MOSFETs, even of the same model.
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Fig. 5. Flowchart of WirelessID system.
signal passes through an inverter, the resulted AC signal,
i.e., the waveform after the processing of inverters and other
components in the wireless charger, carries a fingerprint and
hereafter we call it the wireless charger hardware fingerprint.
At the receiver side, the received AC waveform signal can
be analyzed to extract the fingerprint of a wireless charger.
Details are presented in the following.
B. System Design
The WirelessID system is composed of four modules, i.e.,
signal collection, signal processing, device verification and
trusted database management, as shown in Fig. 5. The signal
collection module collects wireless signals before the charging
process begins. The signal processing module processes the
collected signals and extracts fingerprint features for further
verification. The verification module then queries the trusted
database in the cloud to verify whether the wireless charger
is trusted, i.e., whether the fingerprint is pre-registered. The
trusted database management module manages and updates
trusted fingerprints.
1) Signal Collection: According to the Qi standard, during
a normal wireless charging process, there are in total three
stages: a standby signal stage for a to-be-charged device
detection, a connection signal stage, and a power transmission
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Fig. 6. The collected standby stage signal
signal stage. We choose the first stage for fingerprint extraction
because the charger and the smartphone are not connected yet
to avoid any risks as well as the last two stages are not stable
enough. For each collection, the collected signal lasts for 50
ms with a sampling requirement of 500 kHz (the wireless
charging signal is 100-200 kHz). In our prototype, we use
a software radio USRP for signal collection. In practice, the
signal collection function should be achieved on smartphones
and we discuss the implementation details in Section VI.
2) Signal Processing: In this step, the collected signal trace
is processed to obtain the fingerprint for the wireless charger.
Signal segmentation and pre-processing. The collected
standby signal is composed of active period signals and
inactive period signals as shown in Fig. 6. So we can slice
the received signal to obtain the active period signal. In this
part, we intercept the 50 millisecond signal as a trace for
every device. In order to remove the interference from high
frequency noise, we utilize a digital Butterworth low-pass
filter. We also normalize the raw signal strength to eliminate
random disturbance.
Feature extraction. For each processed signal trace, we
extracted 40 scalar features in the time domain and frequency
domain. To further determine key features, we exploit FEAST
toolbox [36], which is a feature ranking tool commonly used
in machine learning, to choose important features. From the
results, we obtain a feature set as the fingerprint for each
signal. The feature set includes Linear-Trend [37] in 5, 10,
50 chunks, on which remarkable distinctions can be observed
in Fig. 4. These features match the nonlinear switching process
of MOSFET.
3) Verification: The verification module is at the cloud
sever side and exploits supervised learning to classify each
extracted fingerprint. The verification module compares the
uploaded fingerprint with existing ones in the database and
verification passes, i.e., the represented wireless charger is
trusted if the fingerprint matches with one of the registered
fingerprints in the database. For the sake of high classification
accuracy and robustness over a single classification algorithm,
we employ the Extra Trees algorithm.
Algorithm training. During the training process, for a
specific device, we use k traces from it as a positive class,
USRP N210
Wireless Charging Boards
Data Processing Laptop
Receiver Coil
Fig. 7. Lab Environment Experimental setup
and k traces from all other devices as a negative class to train
a binary classifier. The cloud server trains the corresponding
model for each device and stores it in the cloud. In real-world
deployment, we may need to extend our system when a new
device comes and registers. We extract features and train set
of the new device, generate a new two classifier without the
need of retraining the original classifiers. Then we combine
the new classifier with the existing classifier to form a new
classification system.
4) Trusted Database Management: The trusted database
is a whitelist of verified wireless chargers. It supports user
queries for verification and updates. Whenever a new trusted
wireless charger should be added to the database, the clas-
sification model should be re-trained. In this paper we only
demonstrate the possibility of fingerprinting wireless chargers
and leave the model training on large scale devices in the
future work.
V. EVALUATION
A. Experiment Setup
Fig. 7 shows the experiment setup. We have conducted
experiments with 8 wireless chargers covering the mainstream
brands on the market in the lab environments.
Wireless chargers. The 8 wireless chargers used in our ex-
periment are from 4 different manufacturers and of 6 different
models, as shown in Table I. Note that #1, #2 and #3 are from
the same manufacturers but different models while #4 and #5
are exactly of the same model, as the case for #7 and #8.
Collection device. We use a receiver coil from a smartphone
and the coil is connected to USRP N210 equipped with a
LFRX daughterboard. The USRP is driven by compatible
software Gnuradio in Linux platform. We tune the sample
rate to be 500 KHz in all the following experiments especially
evaluation the influence from sampling rate.
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Fig. 8. Micro-benchmark evaluation results of WirelessID.
Trusted sever. We utilize a ThinkPad T440p laptop as the
server to perform training and classification. The laptop is with
Intel i5 4200M CPU, 4G RAM, and Intel 7260 BGN wireless
network adapter.
Dataset description. Under the above hardware setup, we
collect 1000 traces for each of the 8 wireless chargers. Each
trace is 50ms long after processed. The data collection period
is 5-month long.To train and evaluate the classification model,
we evenly select 1000 traces from the 8000 traces and leave
the rest 7000 traces for testing.
TABLE I
SPECIFICATION OF THE WIRELESS CHARGERS USED IN THE
EXPERIMENTATION.
No. Manufacturer Model No. Manufacturer Model
1 Torras CDRZ17 5 Baseus BSWC-08
2 Torras CDRZ21 6 Mophie 110-02961-A
3 Torras CDRZ25 7 UGREEN CD134
4 Baseus BSWC-08 8 UGREEN CD134
B. Performance Metrics
Given a fingerprint from a wireless charger, WirelessID
verifies whether it belongs to the category that it claims to
be in. That is, a classifier is maintained for each registered
device. For each classifier i, we define TPi as the true
positives for classifier i, which means that a device is classified
correctly. FNi refers to the number of devices that are wrongly
considered the malicious devices and FPi refers to the number
of fingerprints that are wrongly accepted as i, respectively. We
define the standard classification metrics for each classifier
i as: Pr(i) = TPi(TPi+FPi) , Re(i) =
TPi
(TPi+FNi)
, and F1-
Score(i) = 2×Pri×Rei(Pri+Rei) . The final precision, recall and F1-
Score for WirelessID are the average of all evaluated wireless
chargers.
C. Micro-benchmark Evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate the impact of classifier
choices and sampling rate. All devices from Table. I are chosen
for the micro-benchmark evaluation.
a) Classifier choice: We compare 10 most commonly-
used supervised learning algorithms, including 1) Logistic
Regression, 2) Gaussian Naive Bayes, 3) K-Nearest Neighbors,
4) Linear Discriminant Analysis, 5) Quadratic Discriminant
Analysis, 6) Decision Tree, 7) Support Vector Machine, 8)
Extra Trees Classify, 9) Random Forest, and 10) Gradient
Boosting. We utilize the default threshold and employ the 10-
fold cross validation to evaluate the classifier performance.
We randomly choose 100 traces from each device, feed them
into the classifiers and record the corresponding accuracy. The
results in Fig. 8(a) show that 3) K-Nearest Neighbors, 7)
Support Vector Machine and 8) Extra Trees Classify are the
top 3 classifiers in terms of precision, recall, and F1-score.
Therefore, we chose Extra Trees Classify as our candidate
classifier.
b) Sampling rate: We also set the sampling rate of the
collection device from 500kHz to 1MHz, 2MHz, 4MHz and
8MHz respectively. At each sampling rate, we collect 50
traces for each device for training and testing. The resulting
precisions and recalls are shown in Fig. 8(b), from which we
can observe that there is little change for the three metrics. At
all sampling rates, the precision, recall, and F1-score of the
system is higher than 98.6% . In order to minimize overhead,
WirelessID selects 500 kHz as the sampling rate.
c) Confusion matrix: To evaluate the influences from
manufacturers and models, we plot the confusion matrix in
terms of classification accuracy. Each cell such as (i, j) in
the matrix represents the possibility of classifying i to j. The
confusion matrix is shown in Fig. 8(c). The results illustrate
that all 8 devices are almost classified correctly. There exists
slight classification errors between #1 and #2, #4 and #5. We
will further improve the accuracy in the future by selecting
more robust features.
D. Overall Performance
a) Impact of time: We trained the classifier with the data
collected in first month and tested the classifier with the data
collected in the second, third, fourth and fifth months. Fig. 9
shows that the three metrics have no correlation with time.
That is, the fingerprint is stable and does not change with
time.
b) Impact of environment: To investigate the impact of
environments, we test WirelessID in the office, laboratory
and conference room environments. As shown in Fig. 10,
WirelessID’s average precision, recall rate and F1-score can
all exceed 98%.
c) Scalability: In real-world deployment, WirelessID
needs to identify alien devices which are not trained before-
hand. We randomly choose 7 devices for training and the
rest one serves as alien device. For each device we randomly
choose 50 traces to assess whether the alien device is classified
as the 7 devices. We repeat the experiment for 20 times to
eliminate randomness errors. We plot the miss rate, i.e., the
alien device is classified as a registered one and plot the CDF
in Fig. 11. The results reveal that WirelessID hardly misses
the alien device with an average probability of only 0.9%.
d) Impact of other factors: We also evaluate the re-
ceiving distance of the wireless signals from the chargers.
Although the receiving distance affects the strength of the
received signal, after normalization, the strength of the re-
ceived signal should not have any affect on the classification
performance. Besides, we test different placement angles on
the charger. At present, both the transmitting coil and the
receiving coil are circular coils, so the change in the placement
angle does not matter.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Security Analysis
We assume that attackers are aware of the WirelessID
system, but cannot compromise the trusted server and the
classifiers. This represents the most realistic scenario where
attackers have full control of the wireless charger but not
the cloud. The goal of the attackers is to fool WirelessID
to classify a malicious device as legitimate. Under extreme
circumstances, an attacker can record the signal from a le-
gitimate charger and then replay it to confuse WirelessID
system, for example, as WirelessID detects only a small
segment of the signal located in the head. the attack should
fail because the hardware fingerprint of the replay device itself
is introduced and the resulted fingerprint is not recognized.
Another case is that the attacker may disassemble the inverters
from a legitimate wireless charger and then install them on
its malicious device. Although the hardware fingerprint of
the inverters plays a key role in the signal analysis and
authentication, as shown in the figure, LC filter circuit of
the wireless charging board and transmitting antenna coil will
also contribute to the hardware fingerprint. It is extremely
difficult assembly a wireless charger with characteristics iden-
tical to another one. Further more, we compared hardware
security measures such as PUF and security chip with our
WirelessID system. Although these measures can achieve the
same hardware certification effect, they require changes to
the wireless chargers’ hardware under current standards, so
it is not possible to certify existing devices on the market.
Attackers can steal exploit the wireless charger already on the
market to to evade security certification. Compared to These
measures, WirelessID does not require additional processing
to the device hardware of wireless chargers, nor does it require
changes to the existing wireless charging transport protocol (Qi
standard). Therefore, WirelessID can certify existing wireless
chargers on the market.
B. Limitations
The WirelessID system has several limitations to be ad-
dressed in the future.
Implementation on the smartphones. In our current pro-
totype, we used USRP N210 to collect wireless signals. Since
the wireless charging module of smartphones fail to transmit
the received charging signals to the OS, WirelessID cannot be
directly applied to the existing smartphones. In addition, the
extraction of hardware fingerprint requires kHz-level sampling
rate. Therefore, we need to add an extra AD sampling chip on
a smartphone for signal collections.
The affect of multiple coils. Some wireless chargers,
e.g., surface charging desk, use multiple induction coils to
accommodate different charging locations. According to Qi
standard, multiple coils are connected in parallel in the circuit
and they share the same inverter. This will be a challenge
to WirelessID because different coils plus the identical in-
verter result in different fingerprints. We can train all the
coil+inverter combinations to cope with this situation.
Software tampering attack. If an attacker can just tamper
with a legitimate wirelss charger’s software program to achieve
some kind of attack (although most of the currently known
attacks require hardware changes), then our WirelessID system
may not recognize this kind of attack. So our WirelessID
system is focused on identifying and detecting hardware
tampering attacks which can pose a greater threat.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose WirelessID, an effective wireless
charger fingerprinting system utilizing the non-linear distortion
effects of inverters, to detect potential short-range malicious
wireless charging attacks. We prototype WirelessID and use
it to conduct experiments on 8 commercial wireless charging
boards. The results show that WirelessID can achieve 99.0%
precision, 98.9% recall and 98.9% F1-sore. Moreover, we
evaluate factors such as time, environment, sampling rate and
location that may affect our system.
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In the future work, we will further expand the number and
types of tested devices, timely study new wireless chargers,
optimize the existing classification model, and improve the
generalization ability. We will do more in-depth research on
wireless charging attack based on software tampering, and
research on wireless charging process protection from more
aspects of signal characteristics. Furthermore, we consider the
security of mobile reverse wireless charging. The application
of reverse wireless charging technology may bring some
threats to mobile data and personal privacy, which needs
further research.
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